Population Size, Per Capita Income, and the Risk of Civil War: Regional Heterogeneity in the Structural Relationship Matters by Markus Brückner
 
 
Copyright  ©  UNU-WIDER 2011 
*Universitat Pompeu Fabra, email: markus.bruckner@upf.edu 
This study has been prepared within the UNU-WIDER project on Africa Development: Myths and 
Realities, directed by Augustin Fosu. 
UNU-WIDER gratefully acknowledges the financial contributions to the project by the Finnish Ministry 
for Foreign Affairs, and the financial contributions to the research programme by the governments of 
Denmark (Royal Ministry of Foreign Affairs), Finland (Finnish Ministry for Foreign Affairs), Sweden 
(Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency—Sida) and the United Kingdom (Department 
for International Development—DFID). 
ISSN 1798-7237  ISBN 978-92-9230-381-5 
Working Paper No. 2011/18 
 
Population Size, Per Capita Income, 
and the Risk of Civil War 
 








A common finding in the empirical civil war literature is that population size and per 
capita income are highly significant predictors of civil war incidence and onset. This 
paper shows that the common finding of population size and per capita income having a 
significant average effect on civil war risk in a world sample breaks down once country-
and year-specific unobservables are accounted for. However, for Sub-Saharan Africa 
there continues to be a highly significant average effect of population size and per capita 
income on civil war risk that is robust to the use of country- and year-fixed effects and 
instrumental variable techniques.  
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1 Introduction 
Civil wars bear an immense welfare cost—they kill and maim millions, displace many 
millions more, disrupt production, and destroy capital and infrastructure. Fearon and 
Laitin (2003) estimate that since the end of the Second World War civil wars have 
caused more than 16.2 million battle casualties. Many more people have been killed or 
disabled in civil war as a result of strategic violence against the civilian population and 
the spread of lethal diseases (Ghobarah, Huth and Russeth 2003; Montalvo and Reynal-
Querol 2007). Beyond the immense humanitarian suffering, civil wars are a major 
stumbling block for economic growth—they destroy infrastructure, deter investment, 
debilitate social networks, and reinforce bad governance (World Bank 2003). Collier 
and Hoeffler (2004) estimate that seven years of civil war reduce total income between 
41 per cent to 305 per cent of initial GDP and Bellows, and Miguel (2006) show that 
through the adverse effects on political institutions civil wars have potentially long-run 
implications for economic development. 
Are a smaller country population size and/or higher per capita income levels the key to 
reducing the risk of civil war? Providing a satisfactory answer to this important policy 
question is unfortunately not easy because simple correlations between civil war, 
population size, and per capita income levels do not imply that there exists a causal 
effect of population size and per capita income on civil war. This is because country 
population size and per capita income are themselves a function of civil war. Moreover, 
there are many difficult-to-measure variables in the cross-section reflecting cross-
country differences in social fragmentation, institutional quality, history, and culture 
that could easily be related to both civil war, country population size, and the level of 
per capita income.  
This paper shows that indeed the positive relationship between low per capita income, 
large country population size, and a higher risk of civil war breaks down in a world 
sample once unobservable cross-country and year-specific heterogeneity is taken into 
account. Statistically, the implication of this negative result is that the relationship 
between a higher risk of civil war, a larger country population size, and lower per capita 
income could be driven entirely by (unobservable) cross-country differences, and thus 
could be possibly spurious due to neglected cross-country heterogeneity in the quality of 
(informal) institutions, social fragmentation, history, and/or culture.1 
From a policy point of view it would be premature, however, to conclude from this 
negative result that the risk of civil war will not systematically decrease in countries that 
are at a high risk of suffering from civil war if their country population size decreases or 
the level of per capita income increases. This is because using in a world sample just the 
within-country variation in population size, per capita income, and the incidence and 
onset of civil war ignores the important cross-sectional information that rich OECD 
countries have not experienced a civil war since the end of the Second World War. 
While within-country variations in per capita income and population size may well have 
affected the risk of civil war in low-income regions, it may seem in a world sample as if 
                                                 
1  This resonates with Djankov and Reynal-Querol (2010) who also find that the relationship between 
civil war and per capita income disappears in a world sample once country-fixed effects are accounted 
for.   2
there is no average marginal relationship because rich countries were shielded from the 
incidence and onset of civil war. Moreover, using just within-country variation in 
population size, per capita income, and the incidence and onset of civil war, calls for 
appropriately dealing with the reverse effects of civil war incidence and the onset on the 
size of the country population and the level of per capita income.2 
Several papers have shown that exogenous shocks to per capita income and population 
size do, in fact, significantly increase the risk of civil war incidence and onset in Sub-
Saharan Africa (SSA). Miguel, Satyanath, and Sergenti (2004) in their seminal 
contribution to the civil war literature showed that negative, rainfall-driven income 
shocks significantly increased the risk of civil war in the Sub-Saharan region during the 
1981–99 period. Their main message—that income shocks are a key determinant of 
African civil war—was recently confirmed by Brückner and Ciccone (2010) who 
showed that there is also a robust negative relationship between per capita income 
growth and civil war onset when using international commodity price shocks as 
instrumental variables for income growth. Extending the instrumental variables 
framework to deal with the endogeneity of population size to civil war, Brückner (2010) 
showed that both an increase in the population size as well as adverse shocks to the 
level of per capita income are significantly associated with a higher risk of civil war in 
SSA. Thus, instrumental variable regressions that account for unobservable cross-
country and year-specific heterogeneity confirmed the link between larger population 
size, lower per capita income, and a higher risk of civil war, at least for SSA. 
An important question that remains to be answered is whether the instrumental variable 
results are specific to the Sub-Saharan region. Clearly specific to the Sub-Saharan 
region is the vulnerability of many of these countries to drought and international 
commodity price shocks. The high poverty rates and lack of public insurance in many 
SSAn countries imply that slumps in the international prices of exported commodities 
and drought shocks substantially reduce incomes, and in the case of extremely harsh and 
long-lasting drought, also the population size.  
To answer the question of whether the structural relationship between civil war, per 
capita income, and population size is different for SSA, I use in this paper a world 
sample of civil war country-years spanning the period 1945–99 from Fearon and Laitin 
(2003) to test whether the marginal effect of population size and per capita income on 
civil war is significantly different for the Sub-Saharan region. My main finding is that 
indeed the link between larger country population size, lower per capita income, and a 
high risk of civil war is particularly strong in the Sub-Saharan region. In the world 
sample, on the other hand, there is no significant link between population size, per 
capita income, and civil war risk when pooling over all countries. The important 
implication for empirical research is that more attention needs to be paid to regional 
heterogeneity in the structural relationship between population size, per capita income, 
and civil war risk. On the economic policy front, an important implication from the 
research is that in SSA population control and income growth promoting strategies have 
particularly high pay-offs in terms of reducing the risk of civil war. 
                                                 
2  See here also Blattman and Miguel (2009) who emphasize the same point in their review of the civil 
war literature.    3
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides a brief 
discussion of the literature on the link between population size, per capita income, and 
civil war. Section 3 discusses the estimation strategy. Section 4 presents the paper’s 
main results and Section 5 concludes.  
2 Literature  overview 
2.1  Per capita income and civil war 
‘No Society can surely be flourishing and happy, of which the far greater 
part of the members are poor and miserable’.Adam Smith (1776) in The 
Wealth of Nations. 
In their sensitivity analysis of variables—identified in the empirical conflict literature as 
potential determinants of intrastate war—Hegre and Sambanis (2006) conclude that per 
capita income and population size are very robust and a significant predictor of civil war 
onset. The first to emphasize this negative relationship between income per capita and 
civil war were Collier and Hoeffler (1998) who argued that economic conditions which 
shape the viability of civil war trumph grievances because grievances, though being a 
necessary condition, are not sufficient for civil war to break out. This strong message by 
Collier and Hoeffler found itself later into the influential World Bank (2003) report 
Breaking the Conflict Trap and has since received also substantial attention by the 
academic conflict literature.  
In an also influential study Fearon and Laitin (2003) confirmed the Collier and Hoeffler 
(1998) claim that per capita income is a key predictor of civil war onset. However, 
while Collier and Hoeffler (1998; 2004) argued that lower per capita income is a proxy 
for a lower opportunity cost of waging war, Fearon and Laitin argued that the channel 
through which lower per capita income increases the risk of civil war is weak state 
capacity.  
On the theoretical front, another argument for why civil war is more frequent in 
countries with low per capita income is that per capita income may be a predictor for 
happiness and/or the willingness to participate in revolution. MacCulloch (2003) finds 
in an extensive microdata survey—taken randomly across 250,000 people in over 61 
countries—that the tastes for revolt against the government are negatively correlated 
with individuals’ income. MacCulloch (2003) argues that poor people have stronger 
preferences for rebellion because their expected income gain is higher. On the other 
hand as average per capita income rises the opportunity cost of rebellion increases due 
to the associated destruction of income. DiTella, MacCulloch and Oswald (2003) also 
find that at the macro-level GDP per capita is a strong predictor for the happiness of 
nations. Thus, there is evidence that low levels of GDP per capita give rise to motives 
among large parts of the population favouring political change, which may be 
associated with mass intrastate violence.  
2.2  Population size and civil war 
‘The prodigious waste of human life occasioned by this perpetual 
struggle for room and food was more than supplied by the mighty power 
of population ...An Alaric, an Attila, or a Zingis Khan, and the chiefs   4
around them, might fight for glory, for the fame of extensive 
conquests...but the true cause was a scarcity of food, a population 
extended beyond the means of supporting it’.Thomas R. Malthus (1798) 
in An Essay on the Principal of Population. 
A natural starting point for a discussion of possible reasons for why increases in country 
population size may lead to an increase in the risk of civil war is the Malthusian theory 
of development. Resting on the notion that human life cannot be sustained without 
fulfilling basic alimentation necessities, the Malthusian theory argues that the 
population size of a country is limited by the total amount of output produced in an 
economy. Such a link between population size and output can be derived from 
postulating that the production function exhibits diminishing returns to scale in labour, 
which implies that there exists a uniquely determined level of subsistence per capita 
income below which the population size will shrink because total output is not sufficient 
to sustain life for the entire population. Within the Malthusian framework, conflict has 
its roots in population expansions that occur without being accompanied by a sufficient 
increase in output. At subsistence income levels such population expansions pose a real 
threat as total output will not be sufficient to guarantee alimentation requirements for 
the entire population. The Malthusian conflict theory predicts that violent conflict may 
occur as groups struggle to secure scarce resources.  
A key reference on this Malthusian explanation of conflict is Homer-Dixon (1994; 
1999) who studied the connection between environmental scarcity and conflict using 
case study analysis. Homer-Dixon classified environmental scarcity as encompassing: 
(i) environmental change, (ii) population growth, or (iii) unequal social distribution. 
Homer-Dixon’s hypothesis was that while the first component would provoke primarily 
interstate resource wars the latter two would induce intrastate conflicts.  
A striking example of population pressure induced conflict from the accounts of Homer-
Dixon is the 1994 Rwandan genocide where over half a million Tutsi were slaughtered 
by Hutu militias. Although a popular explanation of the civil war has been ethnic hatred 
between two very polarized groups, Homer-Dixon points out that Rwanda was at the 
time of the conflict one of the most densely populated countries in the world. Moreover, 
fertile land was in extremely short supply due to a consistent degradation of the 
environment, making food an extremely scarce good. Interviews of Rwandan war 
casualties collected by Andre and Platteau (1998) echo the argument that 
overpopulation and scarcity played a major role in causing the Rwandan genocide.3 
Andre and Platteau report: ‘The 1994 events provided a unique opportunity to settle 
scores, or to reshuffle land properties, even among Hutu villagers ... It is not rare, even 
today, to hear Rwandans argue that a war is necessary to wipe out an excess of 
population and to bring numbers into line with the available land resources’.4 
It is also worth pointing out that there are alternative, non-Malthusian explanations for 
why increases in country population size increase the risk of civil war. Alesina and 
Spolaore (1997; 2003) in their theory of the optimal size of nations argue that when the 
country population size becomes too large, a sub-population will be better of forming a 
                                                 
3  See also Verwimp (2005) who shows that people active in the land market, be it out of land scarcity or 
out of opportunity, had a higher probability of becoming perpetrators in the genocide. 
4  Quoted from Diamond (2005: ch. 10)   5
new state. This argument rests on the trade-off that citizens face between the benefits of 
increasing returns to scale in public good provision and the costs of large political 
jurisdictions. As the distribution of preferences becomes more dispersed the government 
of a state will find it increasingly difficult to meet the demands of its citizens. With 
congestion effects and coordination problems limiting the benefits of scale a sub-
population will be better off to press for secession and form a new state, reaping the 
benefits of self-determination over the allocation of resources and autonomy in the 
drafting of social policy. Increases in country population size can therefore be 
associated with secessionist pressures that may culminate in civil war.  
3 Estimation  strategy 
I use the following econometric model to estimate the average marginal effect that per 
capita income and population size have on the risk of civil war in a world sample 
t c c t c t c t c t c X GDP PopSize War , 1 , 2 1 , 1 , ε θ θ γ α + Γ + + + + = − −      (1) 
where warc,t is an indicator function that is one in country c and year t in the event of 
civil war and zero else, PopSizec,t-1 is the country population size, GDPc,t-1 is real per 
capita GDP, and ΓXc is a vector of (time-invariant) control variables including dummy 
variables for SSA, Asia, Latin America, Eastern Europe, British colonial origin, French 
colonial origin, the log share of mountainous terrain, ethnic fractionalization, the share 
of Muslims in the population, as well as an indicator function for petro-states. Note that 
this vector of control variables ΓXc will be omitted when country-fixed effects αc are 
included since the control variables ΓXc would be perfectly collinear with the country-
fixed effects αc. Common year shocks, such as for example the end of the Cold War or 
global business cycle effects, are captured by the year-fixed effects γt. The error εc,tis 
clustered at the country-level to allow for arbitrary serial correlation within-countries 
across time.  
I will estimate equation (1) using the logit model, and when including the country-fixed 
effects the conditional-fixed effects logit model, because fixed effects in non-linear 
probability models (such as probit or logit) lead to biased estimates due to the incidental 
parameter problem (Wooldridge 2002). To account for dynamics in civil war incidence 
and onset I will also run regressions that include the civil war indicator lagged one 
period on the right-hand side of the estimating equation. I will estimate the dynamic 
equation using both least-squares and system-GMM estimation (Blundell and Bond 
1998), hence assuming a linear probability model.  
Regional heterogeneity in the structural relationship is tested for by allowing the 
coefficient on population size and per capita income to be heterogeneous across regions. 
That is, the following model is estimated: 
ε θ θ γ α ∑ ∑ ∈ − ∈ − + + + + =
R r t c r R r t c r t c t c GDP PopSize War 1 , , 2 1 , , 1 , c,t  (2) 
where the θs, which capture the structural relationship between population size, income 
per capita, and the risk of civil war, can differ across regions.  
   6
4 Main  results 
4.1 World  sample 
Table 1, Panel A presents logit estimates of the average effect that population size and 
per capita income have on civil war incidence in a world sample.5 In column (1) pooled 
panel data estimates are presented which use both cross-sectional as well as within-
country time series variation to identify the effects that differences in population size 
and per capita income have on the risk of civil war. The main finding from the pooled 
panel data regression is that both per capita income and population size show up as 
having a highly significant effect on civil war incidence.6 In column (2) country- and 
year-fixed effects are included. Now the coefficient on the population size variable 
becomes insignificant, while the coefficient on the per capita income variable remains 
significantly negative. Columns (3) and (4) repeat the exercise using a linear probability 
model, which produces very similar results to the non-linear logit model.7 
To account also for dynamics in the incidence of civil war, columns (5) and (6) 
introduce the civil war incidence variable lagged one year as a right-hand-side 
regressor. As can be seen, there is clearly a lot of persistence in the incidence of civil 
war. Moreover, once this persistence is accounted for both the coefficient on the 
population size as well as the per capita income variable turn statistically insignificant 
and become quantitatively small. In Panel B the exercise for civil war onset is repeated, 
which produces the same results: including year- and country-fixed effects that account 
for unobservable cross-country heterogeneity (culture, history, social fractionalization, 
etc.) as well as common year shocks (end of the Cold War, independence waves, world 
business cycle, etc.) population size and per capita income are no longer statistically 
significant, and quantitatively their impact on civil war onset is very small. 
Ignored by the country-fixed effects regressions is of course that many rich Western 
countries did not experience a civil war during the 1945–99 period. This important 
information is not used for computing the slope coefficients on the population and per 
capita income variable in the fixed effects regression. Ignoring this important 
information implies that the cards are stacked against finding a significant effect of per 
capita income and population size on civil war. The reason is that in rich countries 
changes in per capita income and population size will not have an effect on the 
incidence of civil war because these countries never experienced a civil war in any case 
(during the period of analysis).  
                                                 
5 All data are from Fearon and Laitin (2003). The dataset is publically available at: 
www.stanford.edu/~jfearon. 
6  The control variables (not shown) in this regression are indicator functions for SSA, Asia, Latin 
America, Eastern Europe, British colonial origin, French colonial origin, the log share of mountainous 
terrain, ethnic fractionalization, the share of Muslims in the population, as well as an indicator 
function for petro-states. 
7  Note that the explanatory power of the model which includes the country- and year-fixed effects is 
substantially larger (R-squared 0.53) than the model that includes a set of cross-sectional control 
variables (R-squared 0.17). The larger R-squared confirms that there are important cross-sectional and 
year-specific variables omitted from the baseline model which are important in explaining the 
incidence of civil war.    7
To therefore examine what happens to the estimates when taking into account that the 
structural relationship between population size, income per capita, and civil war may 
differ across regions, I repeat the above fixed effects regressions allowing for a 
difference in the marginal effect of population size and per capita income on the risk of 
civil war for different regions. In Table 2, column (1) I do this by running an interaction 
model where population size and per capita income are interacted with an indicator 
variable that is one for all SSAn countries. As can be seen, the coefficient on population 
size in this fixed effects regression is now significant for the SSAn countries. And 
quantitatively the point estimate is now of similar magnitude as the point estimate 
obtained in the pooled panel regression of column (3) in Table 1. In addition, the 
coefficient on per capita income is also of equal or larger magnitude (in absolute terms) 
as in the pooled panel regression of column (3) in Table 1. Hence, the interaction 
regressions that allow for heterogeneity in the marginal effect of population size and per 
capita income on civil war show that indeed for SSA population size increases and per 
capita income decreases increase the risk of civil war.8 
Importantly, the instrumental variable analyses in Miguel et al. (2004), Brückner and 
Ciccone (2010), and Brückner (2010) have shown that this relationship between larger 
population size, lower per capita income, and a higher risk of civil war in SSA prevails 
when accounting for the endogenous response of population size and per capita income 
to intrastate war. In fact, what the instrumental variable estimates show is that the 
effects of population size increases and per capita income decreases on the risk of civil 
war become quantitatively much larger than what least-squares (or SYS-GMM) 
regressions suggest. 
4.2 Sub-Saharan  Africa 
SSA is one of the world’s regions with the highest incidence of civil war. And, it is also 
the world’s poorest region. The population size of the Sub-Saharan region has grown at 
a rate of about 2.5 per cent and is projected to double by 2036.9 Table 3 shows that 
indeed lower per capita income and rapid increases in population size had contributed to 
significantly increasing in the past the risk of civil war in SSA. The estimates in Table 3 
are based on the methodology developed in Brückner (2009) where both population size 
and real per capita income are instrumented to ensure that the obtained point estimates 
reflect the causal effect that within-country changes in population size and income per 
capita have on the risk of civil war. Columns (1) and (3) report instrumental variables 
estimates for civil wars that are over territory, columns (2) and (4) for civil wars that are 
over government. According to the UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset v4-200910, a 
civil war over government is an incompatibility concerning the type of political system, 
the replacement of the central government or the change of its composition. A civil war 
                                                 
8  The estimates of the structural relationship for Latin America and Asia (columns (2) and (4)) are also 
quantitatively large and sometimes statistically significant, which may suggest that also for countries 
in these regions population size and per capita income are important determinants of civil war. 
Unfortunately, no instrumental variable approach has been developed yet that credibly shows that 
these correlations (for Asia and Latin America) really reflect a causal relationship.  
9 web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/COUNTRIES/AFRICAEXT/0,,contentMDK: 
21709116~menuPK:258659~pagePK:2865106~piPK:2865128~theSitePK:258644,00.html 
10Available at: www.prio.no/CSCW/Datasets/Armed-Conflict/UCDP-PRIO/   8
over territory is an incompatibility concerning the status of the specified territory, i.e. 
concerning secession or autonomy.11 
The instrumental variable estimates yield that lower per capita income and a larger 
population size significantly increased the risk of civil war outbreak over government:  
a 5 per cent decrease in real per capita income was associated with an increase in the 
likelihood of civil war outbreak by over 7 percentage points. A 5 per cent increase in the 
population size increased the risk of civil war outbreak by almost 23 percentage points. 
These are very large effects that highlight the serious threat for intrastate stability in the 
Sub-Saharan region which arises from stagnation in per capita GDP growth or a 
continuation in the expansion of the population size. Interestingly, the instrumental 
variable estimates also show that increases in the population size had a significant 
positive and quantitatively large effect on the risk of civil war outbreak over territory. 
However, this was not the case for changes in per capita income which did not 
significantly affect the risk of civil war outbreak over territory. 
5 Conclusion 
The hypothesis that lower per capita income and larger country population size lead to 
an increase in the risk of civil war has received substantial attention by the empirical 
conflict literature. The immense material and humanitarian costs associated with civil 
wars are now well recognized (see for example World Bank 2003). It is therefore 
understandable that substantial reassurance is needed from empirical research that the 
relationship between larger country population size, lower per capita income, and a 
higher risk of civil war is really of causal nature. This paper showed that when using in 
a world sample just the within-country variation in population size, per capita income, 
and the risk of civil war it is crucial to allow for sufficient heterogeneity in the structural 
relationship for different regions. While on average there may be no significant effect 
once country- and year-fixed effects are accounted for in the world sample, for the SSA 
sample there continues to be a significant effect of population size and per capita 
income on the risk of civil war that is robust to the use of country- and year-fixed 
effects, and moreover to the use of instrumental variable techniques.   
What implications do the results of this paper bear for policy? One possible policy 
implication is that strategies that keep a tab on population growth in SSA will have pay-
offs that extent beyond a simple income effect—they reduce the risk of civil war. 
Fertility control, in particular, appears to be a very promising strategy. Also strategies 
that significantly reduce poverty and increase the level of education (especially among 
women) should significantly contribute to reducing population growth rates, and hence 
the risk of civil war. 
It may also be tempting to conclude that partition could be a solution to African civil 
war. This would, however, be precipitous for two main reasons. First, partition will 
most likely create asymmetric pay-offs. If losers are not compensated sufficiently, then 
what was fought as an intrastate war may simply turn into an interstate war between two 
                                                 
11 While in Brückner (2009) instrumental variable estimates were shown when civil wars over territory 
are pooled with civil wars over government, this section of the paper sheds further light on the 
relationship by allowing for a potentially different effect depending on the underlying type of conflict.    9
new states. Second, there are other alternatives available that are less drastic and much 
more cost-efficient.  
A further strategy that could be considered in the fight against civil wars in SSA is 
political and fiscal decentralization (for further reading see here Lake and Rothchild 
2005; Sambanis 2008). This type of strategy would accommodate increases in the 
population size by decentralizing political and fiscal decision-making, and thus reduce 
conflict potential that arises from regional demands for greater self-determination over 
the allocation of resources and the drafting of social policy. While political and fiscal 
decentralization could be a solution in the medium to short-run, there are clearly limits 
to it. In the long run, ensuring that increases in per capita income are maximized while 
expansions in country population size are minimized appears a much more suitable 
strategy. 
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Table 1: Population size, per capita income, and the risk of civil war 
(Average marginal effect) 
  Panel A: Civil war incidence 
 (1)  (2)  (3)  (5)  (6)  (7) 
 Logit  FE  Logit  LS LS LS  SYS-GMM




























Country-fixed effects  No  Yes  No  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Year-fixed effects  No  Yes  No  Yes  Yes  Yes 
R-squared .  .  0.1714  0.5280  0.8259  . 
Observations 6217  6250  6217  6250  6250  6250 
  Panel B: Civil war onset 
 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 
 Logit  FE  Logit  LS LS LS  SYS-GMM




























Country-fixed effects  No  Yes  No  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Year-fixed effects  No  Yes  No  Yes  Yes  Yes 
R-squared .  .  0.0120  0.0476  0.0493  .   12
Observations 6217  6250  6217  6250  6250  6250 
 
Note: The dependent variable in Panel A is civil war incidence, Panel B civil war onset. The method of 
estimation in columns (1) and (2) is maximum likelihood, columns (3) -(6) least squares, and in column (7) 
system-GMM (Blundell and Bond 1998). Huber robust standard errors (shown in brackets) are clustered at 
the country level. *Significantly different from zero at 90 per cent confidence, ** 95 per cent confidence, *** 
99 per cent confidence. 
Source: see text. 
Table 2: Population size, per capita income, and the risk of civil war 
(Regional heterogeneity) 
  Civil war incidence  Civil war onset 
 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
 SYS-GMM  SYS-GMM  SYS-GMM  SYS-GMM 




























































Country-fixed effects  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Year-fixed effects  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Observations   6250  6250  6250  6250 
Note: The dependent variable in columns (1) and (2) is civil war incidence, columns (3) and (4) civil war 
onset. The method of estimation is system-GMM (Blundell and Bond 1998). Autocorrelation and 
heteroscedasticity consistent standard errors are shown in parentheses below the point estimates. 
*Significantly different from zero at 90 per cent confidence, ** 95 per cent confidence, *** 99 per cent 
confidence. 
Source: see text.   13
 
Table 3: Population size, per capita income, and the risk of civil war 
(IV estimates, SSA sample) 
  Civil war incidence  Civil war onset 




























Country-fixed effects  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Year-fixed effects  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Observations   888  888  888  888 
 
Note: The dependent variable in columns (1) and (2) is civil war incidence, columns (3) and (4) civil war 
onset. The method of estimation is two-stage least squares. Huber robust standard errors clustered at the 
country level are shown in parentheses below the point estimates. *Significantly different from zero at 90 
per cent confidence, ** 95 per cent confidence, *** 99 per cent confidence. 
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